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The purpose of this paper is to discuss, based on a specific example (military interventions), 
some analytical problems involved in the construction and use of the ever increasing body of 
quantitative cross-national studies.  Thanks to several waves of technological change, social 
scientists increasingly have recourse to large numerical databases, with the hope of extracting 
from them valid generalisations via probabilistic models. The models themselves have been 
subjected to an increasing sophistication.  On the other hand, reflection on the nature of the 
data and of the counting procedures is still incipient.  Yet such reflection is absolutely crucial.  
Practical researchers seldom read the small print that explains how databases are built, let 
alone invest time in studying the implications of this on the quality of their inferences.  For 
example, the renowned democracy database, Polity,1 is a standard reference point for 
quantitative investigators who want to study democracy or probe its degree of association 
with other variables.  A query in JStore using simple criteria (Polity AND democracy AND 
journals since 1998) yielded 174 refereed journal articles, some of them very influential. 
Polity, however, is deeply problematic, and this will be explored in the following section.  In 
the area of state failure and collapse the situation is worse.  There has been a proliferation of 
databases, all of which have been the target of severe and authoritative criticism (Cammack et 
al. 2006). The quantitative study of civil wars is also highly suspect (Cramer 2003; Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006).  We have chosen for our analysis the study of invasions,2 because of its 
substantive importance but also because it is characterised by several positive traits, which 
might be missing in other fields, and which make quantification quite plausible. If we find 
problems here, a fortiori we would expect them to appear elsewhere. 
 
As the previous paragraph suggests  strong and consequential critiques about how global 
databases are built have already been made.  Our paper pushes the analysis forward in two 
senses. First, there are problems that have not yet been acknowledged and we suggest that 
these might actually be the most fundamental ones. We call the already identified difficulties 
‘Type A problems’, while the new ones that we discuss here we tag ‘Type B’. Second, we 
show that, in a sense, Type Bs are ‘intrinsic’: practitioners may be better or worse, more or 
less cunning and careful, but beyond their idiosyncratic skills and capacities the building of 
many databases (i.e. in the ‘general case’) will face some of the same sticky dilemmas.  We 
stress, however, that we do not write in the spirit of technological conservatism: our purpose 
is to improve quantification, not to eschew it altogether.  
 
In the first section of this paper, we briefly review two literatures: that relating to invasions, 
and to the evaluation of database building across several fields.  In the second section we 
                                                 
1 See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
2 We use the terms intervention and invasion as if they were fully interchangeably expressions.  In the context of 
this paper, invasion will mean military intervention. 
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show that, despite its comparative advantages, the interventions field faces severe Type A 
problems. The third section is dedicated to intrinsic ambiguity, i.e. Type B issues.  In the 
conclusion, we suggest that formal models in the social sciences can, and should, take 
intrinsic ambiguity fully on board. 
 
Literature Review 
It is by no means an exaggeration to claim that, with regards to the field of interventions, 
Rosenau (1969) established a canon that is still useful today. There are two reasons for this 
rare - at any rate in the social sciences - stability.  First, Rosenau provided what even today is 
more or less universally (in the field) recognised as the first fundamental definition of 
invasion issued explicitly for classificatory purposes (Rosenau 1969:161):  
Two characteristics are usually associated with behaviour classified as 
interventionary.  Indeed, although the association is often left implicit, it is so 
pervasive in the literature that the two characteristics would appear to be 
necessary attributes of interventionary phenomena and as such to provide the 
basis for an operational definition.  One is what may be called convention 
breaking character of interventions.  The other is their authority-oriented nature. 
Stated briefly, all kinds of observers from a variety of perspectives seem inclined 
to describe the behaviour of one international actor toward another as 
interventionary whenever the form of the behaviour constitutes a sharp break with 
then-existing forms AND whenever it is directed at changing or preserving the 
structure of political authority in the target society.  
 
Second, Rosenau identified the characteristics that he believed made military interventions 
more amenable to quantification than other phenomena. They are such big scale operations, 
and such political highlights, that they inevitably leave traces. Compared with the study of 
civil wars, or state failure, where data are missing, or critically poor, precisely where they are 
most needed, interventions nearly always leave a wealth of public evidence.  We may add 
that, since many of the most prominent invaders have been democratic countries, the process 
involved in the operation - from the decision to launch it to withdrawal - is registered and 
controlled by public organs and the media.  Modern invasions are also generally bounded in 
time: they have a beginning and an end. Therefore, in contrast to political homicides for 
example, counting invasions should not be that difficult. ‘For this reason’, claims Rosenau 
(1969:155), ‘interventions may be more easily operationalised and measured than is the case 
with other types of influence’.   
 
Experience, though, has shown that Rosenau’s expectations were overly optimistic.  Both 
legal scholars and social scientists have discovered that to build a working operational 
definition of invasion is extremely difficult.  Legal scholars faced a two-fold challenge: first, 
to coordinate the interests of powers that had contradictory interests, which additionally 
fluctuated (Nyiri 1989); and second, to deal with the fact that public definitions are also 
systems of incentives. For example, if military interventions are to be defined by the 
trespassing of the boundaries of a sovereign country by hostile uniformed troops of another 
country, as has frequently been the case, would-be interveners might choose to attack by 
indirect means, launching or supporting non-state armed challenges against the government 
they want to attack (e.g. Nyriri 1989).  Is this method an intervention or not?  The majority of 
mainstream jurists and diplomats answered the question positively, at one time or another; but 
of course indirect aggression is much more difficult to identify. Similar dilemmas were faced 
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by the major actors of the international system, for example at the UN Security Council 
(Ferencz 1972; Nyiri 1989).  
 
Rather surprisingly, social scientists have been slower than lawyers to recognise the enormous 
centrality of the issue of interventions. Despite the fact that these seem to have a rather bright 
future, the field output remains relatively meagre.  Reacting to Rosenau’s programme, 
researchers have: a) criticised its deductive nature, suggesting a more historical and case-by-
case approach (e.g. Finnemore 2003); b) proposed several different operationalisations, which 
have given origin to three major databases (Pearson and Baumann 1992; Regan 2002b and 
Tillema 1991); c) created probabilistic models to spell out the causes or consequences of 
invasions in a given period (for example, Hermann and Kegley 1996, 2001; Meernik 1996; 
Gleditsch et al. 2004; Pearson 1994; Pickering 2001; Regan 2002a; Tures 2005).  In the 
process, several deficiencies at both the definitional and operational level have been 
uncovered.  Hermann and Kegley, in their path-breaking reflection (2001), showed how any 
conclusion about the relation between interventions and democracy would depend on how we 
define the latter.  We can have a purely procedural understanding of democracy, or one more 
related to the existence of certain basic liberties.  They conclude that a procedimental 
specification would permit more optimistic conclusions with respect to the impact of 
interventionism than a more conventional one (Hermann and Kegley 2001: 238, 243-244). 
Other authors, including database builders, have recognised, candidly and lucidly, that the 
counting procedure is not easy at all (see especially Tillema 1991). 
 
Why should this be? The purported advantages that the study of invasions had in Rosenau’s 
vision did not spare them some of the serious dilemmas generally faced by any database 
builder. Some of these were identified by Munck and Verkuilen, in their evaluation of 
democracy databases (2002), especially but not exclusively Polity. Their choice was no 
coincidence: democracy is a very central academic and political concern in the contemporary 
world. Additionally, Polity managers have been extremely careful in explaining explicitly 
how and why they have graded the level of democracy in each country or year.  Only very 
few global databases have achieved the level of transparency and accessibility that Polity has.  
What are the problems of Polity and other major democracy databases according to Munck 
and Verkuilen? Mainly, that there are still ‘important gaps’ related to the conceptualisation of 
the category to be measured, a step that both materially and logically precedes measurement. 
Munck and Verkuilen find that, regarding definition, there are two big dangers: ‘conceptual 
stretching’ (Sartori 1970); and what may be called ‘conceptual restriction’. Munck and 
Verkuilen observe that, in relation to democracy, researchers were too aware of stretching, but 
turned a blind eye to excessive restriction. Additionally, democracy is a multidimensional 
concept, but the ultimate result of each database is an aggregate index of democracy (for 
example, a mark between 0 and 10). Despite this, Munck and Verkuilen believe, the question 
of aggregation has not been sufficiently covered. ‘The selection of level of aggregation’, they 
note, ‘calls for a delicate balancing act’. The ‘sheer amount of attributes and information that 
can be associated with a richly developed’ concept can become unmanageable:  
On the other hand, it is necessary to recognise that the move to a higher level of 
aggregation may entail a loss of validity, in that information about systematic 
variation among the cases may be lost… the selection of the level of aggregation 
is an explicit choice that must be justified in light of the need to balance the desire 
for parsimony and the concern with underlying dimensionality and differentiation. 
(Munck and Verkuilen 2002: 22) 
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In other words, there is a trade-off between validity and tractability. This is an extremely 
important point, to which we will return below.  Measurement itself is full of sunken reefs. 
Investigators have to juggle with multiple indicators for the same phenomenon, and they have 
no clear recipe to choose one or the other. Munck and Verkuilen showed how the intention of 
addressing this issue through radical simplification was self defeating. They conclude that: 
..with a few notable exceptions, existing democracy indices have displayed a 
fairly low level of sophistication concerning the process of aggregation. The 
biggest problem is that most index constructors have simply assumed that it is 
appropriate and desirable to move up to the highest level of aggregation, that is, to 
a one-dimensional index.  (Munck and Verkuilen 2002: 27). 
Similar glaring flaws have also been found in other major databases and influential statistical 
exercises.  For example, quantitative studies of civil wars have been challenged from many 
points of view: establishment of purely ad hoc cut-off points, wrong or equivocal proxies (e.g. 
Cramer 2003) and poor operationalisation of the concept - often the measurement simply does 
not capture the underlying idea. Let us see now how the interventions field fares in this 
regard. 
 
‘Type A’ Problems 
Despite the fact that it exhibits more conceptual coherence than several other fields, and that 
it deals with a comparatively simple (vis-à-vis democracy, say) and directly observable 
phenomenon, the study of interventions suffers from many of the drawbacks pinpointed by 
Munck and Verkuilen, among others. These are more or less immediately perceivable and 
here we highlight the main ones.  First, there is an almost overwhelming conceptual 
dispersion. Despite the weight of Rosenau’s influence, every author adopts his or her personal 
definitional variant, occasionally unaware that subtle differences between one definition and 
another might alter decisively the quantification. In Table 1 we show the level of coincidence 
of the three major extant invasion databases.   
 
Table 1: Correlation between the three databases 
 
  Pearson & Baumann 1992 Regan 2002 Tillema 1991 
Pearson & Baumann 1992 1   
Regan 2002 0,0566 1  
Tillema 1991 0,3526 0,118 1
 
It should be noted that they fully agree in only 15 percent of the cases: an almost purely 
random result.  In other words, to decide what is or is not an invasion, one might as well toss 
a coin!  Clearly, each database is counting different things. The root of the problem is related 
to Munck and Verkuilen’s stretching-restricting (or to put it another way, comprehensive but 
intractable vs. tractable but flat) dilemma. There are authors, and databases, that would try to 
stick to the most formalistic possible definition, to be able to identify with the maximum of 
clarity the cut-off points (where an event becomes interventionary). For example, both 
Pearson and Baumann (1992) and Tillema (1991) establish that an invasion must involve the 
movement of regular troops within the target country (See Table 2). Thus, they will count as 
invasions only those events in which uniformed members of the armed forces of a country 
trespass the borders of another (Gleditscht et al 2004; Hermann and Kegley 2001; Walter and 
Snyder 1999). But this is simultaneously too restrictive and too broad - and it completely 
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ignores the very long legal debate referred to above. It also produces severe anomalies.3  
Other databases aim to be more inclusive (Regan 2002), but then where to establish the cut-
off points for expanding your definition is a question that remains open.  Second, the ‘delicate 
balance’ related to multidimensionality has not been achieved. Neither journal papers nor the 
codebooks of the databases explicitly justify the specific level of aggregation that has been 
chosen.   
 
Table 2: Definition, Dimensions and Aggregation 
 
Authors Definition Dimensions Stretching or Restriction Aggregation 
Pearson & 
Baumann 
1992 
‘We continue to define military intervention 
operationally as the movement of regular 
troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, 
etc.) of one country into the territory or 
territorial waters of another country, or 
forceful military action by troops already 
stationed by one country inside another, in 
the context of some political issue or dispute. 
Regular forces here do not include 
paramilitary forces, as defined by the 
MILITARY BALANCE publications of the 
IISS, and since actions by border guards or 
police are therefore excluded, we run less risk 
than in the past of including very minor border 
skirmishes and shooting incidents.’ 
5 
Restriction: It 
does not 
include 
paramilitary 
force and 
actions by 
border guards 
or police 
(skirmishes and 
shooting 
incidents) 
Didn’t use 
Regan 2002 
‘I define third party interventions in intra-state 
conflicts as convention breaking military 
and/or economic activities in the internal 
affairs of a foreign country targeted at the 
authority structures of the government with 
the aim of affecting the balance of power 
between the government and opposition 
forces.’ 
4 
Restrriction: 
Civil war       
Stretching: 
military and 
economic 
Didn’t use 
Tillema 
1991 
‘Overt military interventions represent direct 
military operation openly undertaken by a 
state's regular military forces within foreign 
lands in such  a manner as to risk immediate 
combat, hence war, merely if they encounter 
armed resistance… It represents all combat-
ready foreign military operations undertaken 
by regular military forces and only such 
operation.’ 
4 Stretching: All combat Didn’t use 
 
Codification in the field of invasions remains basically idiosyncratic.  For example, Tillema 
(1991) makes a gargantuan effort to substantiate the inclusion of his events on a case-by-case 
basis, but fails to explain the operational criteria used for such inclusion, let alone for 
exclusion.   Idiosyncratic codification is not reliable, among other things because social 
scientific concepts are interactive and evolve historically (Cramer 2003, 2006; Finnemore 
2003; inter alia).  This in principle should not be considered an unsolvable problem, because 
by ‘climbing the ladder of abstraction’ (Sartori 1970) – or delimiting adequately the period – 
it is always possible to capture the essential aspects of the phenomenon.  However, if 
historical malleability is not factored in, then the probable result will be definitions tailored to 
one period or to one type of invasion.   More trying is the interactive, non-parametric (Elster 
                                                 
3 Events like the Bay of Pigs incursion, or operation PBsuccess, Sudan and Egypt in Chad (1981) are not 
included in any of the three databases. The major undertaking of the US in Nicaragua in the years 1989-1992 
(ONUCA) is classified as an intervention by Pearson and Baumann, but not by Regan. 
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1992), character of the concept.  This affects especially strongly all definitions related to the 
use of force.  The post-World War II institutions were built having in mind the objective of 
preventing aggressive militarism. The cost of being tagged as an aggressor can be very high.   
Invaders therefore endeavour to conceal their acts.  They do so juridically, trying to show that 
the event corresponds to some concept of legality and justice.  They do so politically, 
maintaining that the invasion is legitimate for a variety of reasons.  As the international 
context makes some forms of interventions particularly costly and burdensome, invaders not 
only change their words but also their deeds, for example privileging indirect intervention or 
including in every interventionary event a democratic agenda.  Long ago, a legal scholar 
stated that ‘it is seemingly easier to evoke aggression than to dispel it, and easier to commit 
aggression than to define it. What has been universally condemned as ‘the gravest of all 
crimes against peace and security throughout the world’ has yet to be consensually 
particularized’ (Ferencz 1972). At least in the legal field, this dismal conclusion still holds. 
 
The concept of intervention is related in quite a complex form to other ones such as 
aggression.  ‘Invasion’ is a term that is semantically surrounded by other terms and concepts 
that are not quite synonyms: ‘war’, ‘imperialism’, ‘international incident’, ‘military aid’, for 
example. It is very clear that there is a dense interconnection between all the elements of this 
web. Furthermore, there is an affinity between intervention and military aid: should countries 
that get huge levels of aid from another be considered ‘intervened’ or not? Whatever the 
answer, it should be consistent.4 The problem has already been noted by Rosenau,  Regan and 
others. As Rosenau (1964: 153) remarks: 
Often intervention is defined in such a general way that it appears to be 
synonymous with imperialism, aggression, colonialism, neocolonialism, war, and 
other such gross terms that are used to designate the noncooperative interactions 
of nations. One observer, for example, finds it useful to define imperialism in 
terms of ‘action that … are intrusions into the affairs of another people’, a 
definition which is hardly differentiable from the view that ‘intervention’ refers to 
conduct with an external animus that intends to achieve a fundamental alteration 
of the state of affairs in the target nation... Nor is noncooperative animus 
necessarily considered to be a characteristic of interventionary behavior. Foreign 
aid programs have been classified as intervention, and, to the distress of some 
international law specialists, so have collective security measures taken by several 
nations to protect their common interests. 
 
‘Type B’ Problems 
We start by revisiting the problem of multidimensionality. Not only does finding the adequate 
level of aggregation require a ‘delicate balance’; there are other quite fundamental issues that 
have not been addressed by the literature, and that even the most sophisticated criticisms to 
existing databases have still not fully captured.  The first one is the problem of aggregation 
from the point of view of the logical operators used to ‘flatten’ the concept from many 
dimensions to one. In other terms, not only the level but also the type of aggregation is an 
issue. If there is definitional dispersion in the field (in the sense that each researcher has his or 
                                                 
4 Existing databases appear to violate this minimal condition, classifying some forms of aid as intervention and 
ignoring others. For example Colombia appears invaded in 1989 (by the United States) in Regan (2002). Why in 
this year and not in others? Cuba is invaded in 1978 (by the Soviet Union) in Pearson and Baumann (1993); 
Tanzania, 1964 in Tillema (1991) and Pearson and Baumann (1993).  Idiosyncratic codification would seem to 
invite all kind of biases and inconsistencies. 
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her own version of what an invasion is, and that this has a potentially big impact on 
measurement), aggregation dispersion (in the sense that each author uses different logical 
operators, almost never explaining why) is even more eminent. A glimpse of this is captured 
in Table 2.    
  
In Table 3, we analyse 67 different journal definitions of invasion from a formal point of 
view.  In column 1 we put the number of criteria, in columns 3 to 6 the operators used to 
aggregate them, and in column 2 the number of definitions (from the universe of 67) that fit 
this description.  For example, row 1 indicates the definitions that used only one criterion; 
naturally, they do not use any aggregation operator. In   the second and subsequent rows come 
the definitions that use two criteria; naturally, they can use only one aggregation operator. 
Row 2 captures the definitions that use two criteria and aggregate them with an AND. The 
majority prefer the broader OR rather than the more restrictive AND.  There are 15 papers 
that opt for pure ANDs, 18 for pure ORs and 12 for a combination of both.  Typically, in this 
corpus of papers not once can there be found a reflection of why one or another combination 
of operators is adopted.  Yet this is crucial, and can be visualised through the following 
simple exercise. If we applied the Rosenau definition with an AND (as the author proposed) 
or with an OR, to the main existing databases, the variation is very big (Table 4).  In Pearson 
and Baumann (1992), of their 667 reported cases, using Rosenau’s definition with an OR we 
would get also 667, and with an AND 532. Regan (2002) – who explicitly bases his coding in 
Rosenau’s definition – counts 551 cases of military intervention (he includes also economic 
intervention). Using a Rosenau’s OR only applied to military events would circumscribe his 
universe to 429, and an AND to 363. The count for Tillema (1991) is 469 with an OR and 254 
with an AND. Simply stated, the use of different aggregation operators fully determines the 
result of the coding procedure. 
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Table 3: Types of classification in the literature (67 definitions) 
 
# of criteria # of 
definitions 
AND OR MAX Non interpretable 
1 13     
2 5 X    
2 14  X   
2 1   X  
3 10 X    
3 4  X   
3 4 X X   
3 1    X 
4 3 X    
4 5 X X   
5 2 X X   
5 1 X X X  
Difficult to specify 5    X 
 
Source: Papers from the following journals: International Security, Vol. 5 (1981); Vol. 20 (1995). American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32 (1988); Vol. 47 (2003). Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29 (1992); Vol.38 
(2001), Vol. 17 (1980), Vol. 26 (1989), Thesis Univeristy of Maryland (2004), The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 39 (1995); Vol. 43 (1999); Vol. 6 (1962); Vol. 27 (1983); Vol. 40 (1996); Vol. 44 (2000); Vol. 
34 (1990); Vol. 39 (1995); Vol. 40 (1996); Vol. 15 (1971); Vol. 13 (1969); Vol. 32 (1988),  The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 97 (2003); Vol. 89 (1995); Vol. 92 (1998); Vol. 74 (1980); Vol. 39 (1945); 
Vol. 51 (1957); Vol. 82 (1988); Vol. 69 (1975); Vol. 94 (2000); Vol. 48 (1954); Vol. 86 (1992); Vol. 83 (1989); 
Vol. 95 (2001). World Politics, Vol.18 (1965); Vol. 32 (1980); Vol. 34 (1982); Vol. 21 (1969); Vol. 44 (1992); 
Vol. 20 (1967); Vol. 42 (1990); Vol. 26 (1974). International Security,   Vol. 23 (1998); Vol. 21 (1996); Vol. 2 
(1977); Vol. 8 (1983). American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47 (2003); Vol. 35 (1991). The Journal of 
Political and Military Sociology (2001). Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 37 (2002). 
Military Affairs Vol. 39 (1975).  Political Behavior, Vol. 20 (1998). ECPR Joint Sessions of Worlshops (2004). 
Thesis Uppsala University (1986). 
 
Table 4: The Rosenau definition with an AND or with an OR  
 
 Pearson & Baumann 
1992 
Regan 2002 Tillema 1991 
No. cases  667 cases 551 cases (132 
economic 
intervention and 
429 military 
intervention) 
469 cases 
OR cases 667 cases 429 cases 469 cases 
AND cases 532 cases 363 cases 254 cases 
 
Second, when reducing a concept from a multidimensional world to a one-dimensional one, 
order becomes an issue.  Concepts that live in a multidimensional space produce data points 
that are not ordered, but ultimately a coder needs an instruction to translate them into an 
ordered set, say of zeroes and ones (or alternatively an ordinal scale), that tells if an event is, 
or is not, an invasion, and (perhaps) how intensely it corresponds to the concept (its ‘degree 
of invasiveness’).  In effect, while scales ‘live’ in a well ordered world with a clear hierarchy, 
social scientific concepts are almost always multidimensional. Multidimensional worlds are 
richer, but are less ordered, than scales.  Indeed, there is a whole set of statistical tools and 
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theories oriented towards the building of correct scales from complex intellectual constructs.  
Operationally, this has many expressions. First, multidimensional concepts can be made less 
complex by factorial and principal component analyses, which allow the researcher to see 
below and beyond an apparently baffling multidimensionality (e.g. Widaman 1993). If this 
type of reduction of order cannot be achieved, then different forms of aggregation can be 
considered (starting from Multidimensional Scaling, a tool explicitly thought to address the 
problem – e.g. Wenstop 1980; Williams and Nigel 2002). Last but not least, approaches such 
as structural equations allow the researcher to incorporate multidimensionality directly into 
the model, assuming that the complex concept is a ‘latent variable’ expressed by other, 
explicit ones (e.g. Bollen 1989). But none of these techniques fully solves the specific 
problem of social scientific databases, partly because none of the above techniques guarantees 
full reduction to a single dimension.  
 
But by far the main complication is that the imposition of complete order may be a quite 
fundamental distortion of the concept.  In effect, it is typical of social scientific concepts – in 
fact, of all multidimensional concepts – that they live in a world where only partial, and not 
total, order exists. Forcing total order operationally is not only contrived, it also misrepresents 
the very idea that is trying to be quantified. Any formalism or codification based on the idea 
that there is an underlying total order assumes a sunken, but generally unwarranted, premise. 
To take a simple example: in Rosenau’s definition, there are two criteria to classify whether 
or not an event is an invasion – its tinkering with the authority structure, and its convention-
breaking nature.  How to compare an event that transforms deeply the authority structure of a 
country while trying to minimise the breaking of convention, with one that operates the other 
way round?  Correspondingly, in Table 5 we see three different types of real life situation: 
those that fulfil both Rosenau’s criteria to an eminent degree; those that are only partially 
authority-oriented; and those that are strongly authority-oriented but only weakly convention-
breaking (because they have been fully supported by the UN, for example).  While the first 
category should go into any database, what to do with the other two? And if they are included, 
how to compare them if they are intrinsically unordered (see Figure 1)? 
It should be noted that, as a consequence, the problem of order affects particularly strongly, 
but not exclusively, those databases that try to arrive at an aggregate, one-dimensional grade.  
However, it also concerns all those database builders who expect to establish a clear cut-off 
point between events and non-events, since to establish this one has to suppose total order. 
 
Table 5: Convention Breaking and Authority-Oriented 
 
  
Convention -Breaking 
AND Authority-oriented Convention-Breaking 
Authority-
Oriented 
Pearson & 
Baumann 1992 
 
 
1969-Prague 
 
1981- Peru & Ecuador 
 
1950-Korean 
War 
 
Regan 2002 
 
 
1975-Angola 
  
1949-China 
Tillema 1991 
 
 
1963-Cyprus 
 
1979-Chad & Libya 
1956-
Dominican 
Republic 
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Figure 1: Intervention or Non-intervention? 
 
Source: authors 
 
The supposition that there is an underlying total order in general entails other difficulties.  
Social scientific concepts tend to be ‘radial’ (Lakoff 1990), in the sense that they are gradual 
(they ‘fade out’ from a prototype to less typical examples, see Figure 2) and are thus full of 
grey areas. Multidimensionality and ‘radiality’ are typical of social science concepts.  In the 
interventions field there are several sources of this intrinsic fogginess. First, there is no 
‘natural’ cut-off point.  Each definition more or less adequately defines what a prototypical 
invasion is. Different events and situations approximate up to a certain point the respective 
prototype.  Where should we put the line below which an event is no longer classified as an 
invasion? The definitions certainly give no specific instructions in this regard.  What will the 
coder do with an event that comes very near the prototype in one dimension, but very far in 
another one?  The solution offered by the invasion databases – idiosyncratic AND binary 
codification – is particularly unattractive. It does not differentiate clearly an event from a non-
event, and in regards to the former it collapses very big ones with very small ones. The 
bombing of a borderline checkpoint, or a hot persecution by a neighbouring country, is 
counted on the same footing as the Vietnam or the Gulf wars.  Somehow, this seems fatally 
wrong.  Including everything in the same mixed bag is a source of confusion; in particular, 
the myriad of very small events acts as noise in relation to the big, prototypical ones, so the 
statistical associations that are found (or rejected) are predicated on a universe very far away 
from the prototype that was supposed to be analysed in the first place (big, canonical 
interventions). For example, as seen in Table 4, using Rosenau’s more stringent AND 
aggregation operator, the number of events from each database is cut by a factor of almost 
two. There is as much noise as information. It is quite clear that no statistical analysis 
performed over this universe of events is speaking about what happens near the prototype. 
Introducing a yardstick to measure the ‘degree of invasiveness’ (or, if preferred, the degree of 
the similarity of a given event to the prototype) would have allowed researchers to 
differentiate events from the point of view of their size and weight. 
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Figure 2: Function R2 – Non-ordered  
 
Note: the classificatory exercise needs a function than goes from R2 – non-ordered world to an ordinal scale 
where total order exists (for any two events A or B, you have A > B, B>A or A=B. 
Source: authors 
 
Basic social scientific concepts are not only ‘radial’, they are also verbal in nature (or 
‘linguistic variables’, Yen and Langari 1999). By this we mean that they are full of linguistic 
hedges, modifiers that speak about the degree to which a condition is fulfilled. You can see 
that the operational Rosenau (1969) definition is plagued by linguistic hedges (we italicise 
them): ‘Two characteristics are usually associated... although the association is often left 
implicit ... seem inclined to belief... sharp break with then-existing forms...’.5  How do you 
know that an implicit relation has been correctly identified? When do you know something is 
sharp or blunt? But such vagueness is not the product of some lack of dexterity by Rosenau: it 
is the social scientific common ground.    
 
It is very difficult to come across a social scientific definition that is not multidimensional, 
radial and heavily hedged. The combination of these three characteristics – when it is 
inevitable – we call ‘intrinsic ambiguity’. We do not claim that intrinsic ambiguity makes 
quantification impossible; we claim, instead, that – when it is present – hardly any model that 
fails to take it seriously is plausible. Lack of plausibility stems from: a) issues related to 
aggregation operators (the use of different operators yields widely different results); b) issues 
related to an uncalled for and hidden assumption of total order, when the original concept that 
wants to be operationalised only establishes partial order; c) issues related to vague cut-off 
points, that leads to contrived and ad hoc solutions; d) issues related to the linguistic, hedged 
nature of social scientific definitions, that inevitably (at least in the general case) includes in 
the concept modifiers that express subjective evaluation of degree (for example, degree of 
similarity to a certain prototype, or intensity in which a phenomenon is present in an event).  
                                                 
5 The same can be said about the definitions that guide the construction of the three major databases.               
See Table 2. 
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Conclusion 
Quantitative cross-national research is here to stay. Not only is technological conservatism 
intellectually wrong, it is also simply unviable.  However, quantitative investigations have to 
face a troubling tension. On the one hand, probabilistic models have become ever more 
sophisticated and abstruse, but on the other hand database building remains as flimsy as ever 
(perhaps increasingly so). Modellers have a lot to say about nuances of correlations, but 
frequently they cannot specify correctly what phenomena they are trying to correlate.  
Researchers have not as yet fully identified and understood all the sources of this tension, nor 
have they extracted from it the necessary conclusions. 
 
Counting is important – but counting what? While in some delimited areas – for example, 
electoral time series – this kind of question is marginal, in many other ones it is central. In 
this paper, we saw that database building in the field of invasions – dealing with a relatively 
clear cut, identifiable, phenomenon, and exhibiting a much better tradition than many other 
ones in tinkering with definitional niceties – is affected by two classes of problems: 
conceptual dispersion and unsolved tradeoffs (Type A), and intrinsic ambiguity (Type B).  
Marginal improvements within the same conceptual universe can help to patch up some of the 
issues raised by Type A. However, if we are right, Type B cannot be dealt with in this 
fashion: vague boundaries, radiality, linguistic hedges, lack of total order, are intrinsic to 
social scientific reasoning. In database building, we would do better to resort to existing 
formalisms that allow us to explicitly model this type of uncertainty (Yen and Langari 1999; 
Pfeilsticker 1981), instead of trying to achieve some kind of spurious clear cut precision. The 
dilemma of indulging in a wholesale rejection of quantification, or simply ignoring 
ambiguity, can and should be solved by taking it fully on board. 
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